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The following was sent by John Kubiak, son of Edmund Kubiak o the 403rd SQ.
Typos and page breaks in the original report have been kept intact.



28 AUGUST, 1945

- RCM -

Radio of Radar counter Measures is divided into four different
and separate branches: 1. Detiection, or location of enemy Radars by
means of receivers, analyzers, and special antenna assemblies; 2. De-
ception, or the 'fooling' of the enemy Radars into 'seeing' more air
craft or surface vessels on their scopes than there are actually are present in
the Radars immediate vincity by means or electronic and mechanical
gagwets; 3. Jamming or saturating the enemy Radars so they are unable
to 'read-through' the presentations on their scopes and interpret the
number, azimuth, and range of our air craft and surface vessels, accom-
plised by electronic and mechanical devices; 4. Anti-jamming, or "un-
saturating' our enemy-jammed scopes by electrical circuits and tech-
nical techniques. RCM as used in this Bomb Group was concerned only in
jamming of enemy SLC and AAFC Radars.

The 43rd's RCM program is the youngest of the Fifth Air Force
Heavy Group. The program first got it's start with Major Foster H. Hunt-
Er, then Captain, handling the adnisnistrative and operational side,
With a Mr. Daeakins, a Technical Representative from RRL in Boston,
taking care of the technical end of the Group's program. RCM was ham-
pered by lack of equipment, experienced maintenance personnel, and
Class A instalations in the Group's air craft. However, this handicap
has been overcome, and at the colose of the war with Japan, this RCM
Organization was as efficient and smoothly-run as any in this theatre.


Our RCM personnel consists of the following: 1st Lt. William M.
Weinbach, Jr. as Group RCM Officer, who joined the Group at Clark
Field in April '45; @nd Lt. Harold B. von Horn, RCM Operations Officer;
2nd Lt. Edmund E. Kubiak, and 2nd Lt. Robert F. Yaffee as RCM Maintenan

Under the control of Lt. Von Horn were nine enlister operators.
One a Cpl. McKay, was killed-in-action over Tainan in May '45. Lt's
Kubiak and Yaffee were assisted in maintenance and installation by twelve
Enlisted mechanics. Lt. Weinbach directed all RCM activities, procured
equipment, and prepared reports, daily and weekly, which were sent to
Fifth Air Force, V BomCom, and Sec.22 of GHQ.

A typical RCM plan was put into effect as follows: From Group Oper
tions it would be learned that a mission was planned, target and numbere
of air craft to be used. From RCM maps and reports edited and published
by Sec. 22 of GHQ, the tppype and number of enemy SLC and AAFC Radars
were ascertained. From V BomCom a suggested RCM plan and summary of
enemy activities was obtained. The number of Raven(RCM) air craft
and type of equipment was then chosen. Squadron Operations were notified,
and Squadron Intelligence were told the RCM plan for their Squadron.

Operators were briefed, equipment installed, and the enemy befuddled!
After the mission, operators were interrogated, maps of rouyte drawn,
overlays developed, equipment checked, maintenance given, and reports
written and distributed.


Interrogation of German PORWs, who were ground Radar operators,
proved that RCM against SLC and AAFC Radars, in the European Theater,
was 70% effective during complete cloud coverage. This means that the
German Radars were less than one third as effective as they would have
Been withour RCM, causing the Germans to throw up a barrage type of
AA fire. This meant a great increase in the expenditure of ammonition,
and a decrease in the loss of Allied lives and air craft. Sec. 22 of
GHQ, the RCM Intelligence Unit in this theater, is, at present, compiling
data and drawing charts from information gotten by the interrogation
of Allied crews and Jap POWs; captured documents, and the intrepertation
of RCM operators logs. From all indications the percentage of the effect-
iveness of RCM of the Pacific Theater against SLC and AAFC Radars will
be still greater than that of the European Theater.

When RCM was first used in quantity in the 43rd, it met with many
and all obstacles. Pilots all but refused to fly the special equipment
and it's operator, crew-members wouldn't cooperate. They couldn't or
wouldn't believe that 150 pounds of the 'right' equipment with an oper-
ator wearing ear-phones logging signals and twisting knobs, was, in
reality instrumental in 'bringin'-'em-back-alive'! The worth of RCM had
to be proven to them. And RCM was proven: By crews from the 63rd report-
ing that emeny search-lites were tracking RCM Rope instead of their air
craft; by 'loosing' the gboggie air craftwho were tracking them with
Radar when RCM Chaff was dropped by our crews; by crews returning from
A 'hot' target and reporting two or three air craft holed instead of


A wing or engine shot away. RCM has proven it's worth and is 'bringin'
'em-bach-alive'! The all conclusive proof is that the crews ASK for
RCM before they go on a mission.

The RCM Program in this Group has saved lives, air craft, and prev
ed a maintenance problem. RCM in the Pacific Theater has hastened V-J
Day (and cold beer.)

RRL---Radio Research Lab
SLC---Search Lite Control
AAFC--Anti-Aircraft Fire Control
POW---Prisonoer of War
Rope--Mechanical RCM
Chaff+ " "

1st LT. 43rd Bomb Group (H)
Group RCM Officer

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